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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the importance of legitimacy and compare how drivers of public policy attitudes evolve 
across the policy process consisting of the input (i.e., the processes forgoing acquisition of power 
and the procedures permeating political decision-making), throughput (i.e., the inclusion of and 
interactions between actors in a governance system), and output (i.e., the substantive consequences 
of those decisions) stages. Using unique panel data through the three phases of the congestion tax 
in the Swedish city of Gothenburg, we find that legitimacy is indeed important in explaining policy 
support. Moreover, we find a lingering effect where support in one phase depends on legitimacy 
both in the present and in previous phases. Hence, our study takes us one step further on the road 
to understand the complicated dynamic mechanisms behind the interactions between policy mak-
ing, policy support, and the legitimacy and approval of politicians and political processes. 
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Introduction 
 
In all societies it is unavoidable that politicians from time to time decide upon and eventually im-
plement policies that lack support among parts of the citizenry. However, in many instances, initial 
negative public attitudes gradually alleviate or even transform into broadened public acceptance and 
support as the public experiences, and thus responds to, different aspects of the policy (Naurin 
2010; Page and Shapiro 1983). Empirical evidence is found in relation to numerous major policy 
decisions ranging from, e.g., the Swedish decision to revert to right-hand traffic in 1967 (which only 
about 15% of the voters supported in the preceding referendum), across the rather recent introduc-
tions of smoking bans in most major cities around the world, to the implementation of single policy 
measures such as the congestion pricing mechanisms in London (Transport for London 2004) and 
Milan (Rotaris et al. 2010). These observations of gradually stronger public support post-
implementation are in line with established theoretical models of policy feedback loops, where a policy 
simultaneously is treated both as an outcome of political processes, as well as an independent varia-
ble influencing public policy attitudes and thus constituting new inputs to the political system (Met-
tler and Soss 2004; Schattschneider 1935; Skocpol 1992). 
 
Although the public policy-public opinion nexus is rather well researched, seen from Easton’s sys-
tems perspective (e.g., Easton 1953), i.e., where policy outcomes affect both the incentives and the 
resources of the mass public (cf. Pierson 1993; Soss 1999; Svallfors 2010), significantly fewer stud-
ies theorize and scrutinize the internal dynamics of the policy cycle and the mechanisms that drive 
changes in public policy attitudes across different stages of the policy process. To better grasp how 
the feedback effects actually play out between citizens and policy makers, such an approach is key. 
In this paper, we suggest that post-implementation changes in policy attitudes are the result of a 
process that unfolds throughout the whole policy cycle, from initial proposal to final implementa-
tion. Furthermore, we theorize that the perceived legitimacy, i.e., whether the policy arises from the 
rightful source and process of authoritative decision-making and whether its content pertains to a 
normatively justifiable interest of a policy (cf. Beetham 1991; Matti 2010), impact public support 
across the input, throughput, and output stages of the policy process. Thus, while we see the policy 
cycle as a continuum (ranging from agenda setting, decision-making, implementation, monitoring, 
evaluation, and eventually proceeding again to agenda setting), we refer to a policy process as a 
subset of this cycle, and in our case it spans the decision-making, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation phases. 
 
In order to test our theoretical predictions, we make use of a unique panel data set, allowing for a 
systematic comparison of public policy attitudes and their antecedents, across the whole process of 
deciding upon and implementing a congestion tax in the Swedish city of Gothenburg. In the next 
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section, we first set the theoretical scene, after which we model this policy process and derive four 
hypotheses for empirical testing. In section 3, we account for our methods, measurements, and 
descriptive statistics of the data. In section 4, we present our results, which is followed by a discus-
sion and concluding section. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses: The Mechanisms of Policy Support 
 
To grasp the dynamics of policy support as the policy process moves across the stages of the policy 
cycle, it is essential to consider if and how the mechanisms and factors likely to affect support 
change over time. Taking up this gauntlet, we start from the proposition that the antecedents of 
policy support stem from the perceived legitimacy of the policy. Accordingly, if perceptions of 
legitimacy, and what legitimacy entails, change throughout the policy process being studied, this 
should subsequently be manifested through corresponding changes in public policy support. 
 
Legitimacy 
Indisputably, legitimacy is one of the foundational concepts in most of the social and political sci-
ences, although rarely associated with the support or compliance on the specific policy level. Most 
commonly, it has an intimate relationship with political power and authority and is frequently treat-
ed as an independent, explanatory factor behind phenomena such as regime performance and as a 
necessary trait for actors, e.g., states, international regimes, and political institutions, who aspire to 
avoid being ousted through elections or revolutions (Beetham 1991; George 1980; Smoke 1994). 
Elsewhere, legitimacy is seen as a prerequisite for political authority, creating the right for the Gov-
ernment to expect obedience from its citizens when exercising its power (Buchanan 2002; 2003), 
therefore determining the costs associated with monitoring and enforcing public compliance 
(Beetham 1991; Birch 2001; Parkinson 2003; Stoker 1998).1 In this category we also find a broad 
range of research occupied with the performance of new, primarily subnational, governance re-
gimes, confirming the suggested connection between high levels of political legitimacy and corre-
spondingly higher levels of support and voluntary compliance with political decisions (cf. Black 
2008; Ostrom 2005; Stern 2008; Tyler 1990). 
 
Input, Throughput, and Output Legitimacy 
Several sources to legitimacy are acknowledged in the literature. Broadly following Scharpf’s (1999) 
Lincolnesque distinction between “government by the people” and “government for the people” 
(cf. Hodson and Maher 2002; Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Skogstad 2003), these sources either 
refer to legitimacy as being founded in the processes forgoing the acquisition of power and the 
                                                     
1
 As captured by Eckstein (1971, 53), “It is hard to think of any goal that is likely to be attained effectively if illegitimacy is 
great, and certainly none that could be as effectively attained with low as with high legitimacy.” 
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procedures permeating political decision-making (input legitimacy), or as connected to the conse-
quences of those decisions (output legitimacy). 
 
Thus, focusing on the input side assists us in identifying the structural problems facing contempo-
rary political institutions, for instance, the well-researched democratic deficit of the European Un-
ion, or in targeting elements of representative democracy such as decision-making accountability 
and control through elections (e.g., Føllesdal and Hix 2006). However, considering output legitima-
cy may also be crucial, especially in the study of a specific policy or policy tool, as it contributes to 
our understanding of the public’s longer-term reactions and responses to these policies (Finger and 
Finon 2011; Scharpf 1999; Wolf 2002). Thus, for output legitimacy to be generated, decisions need 
to conform to the public’s expectations and work for the benefit of the public. 
 
Mainly in studies concerned with new governance systems (i.e., where traditional logic of hierar-
chical government are challenged by the inclusion of a multitude of stakeholders, often spanning 
multiple levels of governance), it has been recognized that merely focusing on legitimacy as a char-
acteristic of input or an output is insufficient if we are to fully understand how legitimacy impacts 
the public’s policy support (Doberstein and Millar 2015; Schmidt 2013). To comprehensively ex-
plain why some new governance systems perform better than others, some scholars therefore pro-
pose also analyzing throughput legitimacy, as distinct from traditional representation (input) or 
performance (output). The throughput dimension of legitimacy is significantly less theorized 
(Schmidt 2013) and is typically conflated to be merely an aspect of input legitimacy (Ba ̈ckstrand 
2006; Scharpf 1999). However, examining political decision-making and implementation by treating 
throughput as a separate aspect of legitimacy allows for a specific focus on the quality of inclusion, 
interaction, and procedures that can nuance the legitimacy-inducing aspects of the decision-making 
process, particularly in multilevel governance structures.2 
 
Policy Legitimacy 
Despite the growing interest and the assumed relevance of legitimacy for explaining regime per-
formance, legitimacy has yet to become a prominent point of departure for explicit studies on pub-
lic policy and specific policy measures. For the most part, public policies are viewed as products 
emerging from a political system. Subsequently, a policy’s legitimacy is mainly seen as dependent on 
the legitimacy of a broader political system. As Wallner (2008) concludes (see also Gormley 2007; 
Smoke 1994), the majority of empirical research in the field of policy studies tend to be concerned 
with evaluating the effectiveness or efficiency of policies or political programs by considering tech-
nical-administrative factors such as problem definition, selection of policy tools, access to re-
                                                     
2
 It is thus intimately linked to the inclusion of deliberative practices and broadened participation where “all those subject 
to the decision in question” (Dryzek 2001, 651) also are allowed to participate and deliberate throughout fair, open, 
inclusive, and transparent governance processes. 
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sources, or the performance of the actors involved in the policy implementation process. This 
means that hitherto studies on specific policies and policy instruments, with a few notable excep-
tions (cf. Citrin and Muste 1999; Montpetit 2008; Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann 2007; 
Wallner 2009), have systematically disregarded the proposition that the legitimacy for a single policy 
might also be a highly significant component affecting its overall performance (Merthens 2004; 
Skocpol 1997; Williams and Edy 1999). Thus, following Peters (2005), legitimacy is not only a mat-
ter to be associated with macro-level politics, such as regime stability or performance. Rather, it is 
equally significant at every level of politics, including micro-level decisions, such as the implementa-
tion and use of specific policy instruments. In these cases, it seems reasonable to assume that not 
only the substantive outputs of a policy, but also the processes and procedures prevalent through-
out the policy cycle, affect perceptions of the policy’s legitimacy, and subsequently, whether or not 
the policy is supported. 
 
On the policy level, therefore, distinguishing between input, throughput, and output allows for 
analyzing how the sources of legitimacy, and thus the drivers of public policy support, vary as the 
process moves forward through the policy cycle: from initial decision-making (input), across im-
plementation (throughput), to the general public’s evaluation of policy outputs. By the same token, 
as political legitimacy can generate public support for an authority and, in the longer term, also a 
propensity among the public to subordinate to that authority, we propose that policy legitimacy can 
serve a similar function as a driver behind policy support. 
 
The conceptualization of legitimacy as stemming from different sources during the input, through-
put, and output phases, respectively, implies that the legitimization of authority should be viewed as 
dynamic. Initially it spans the procedures determining the gaining and exercise of power as well as 
the expected output. Thereafter it primarily involves the processes of implementation, and finally, it 
concerns the evaluation of actual consequences or outputs of decisions being made. On the policy 
level, this suggests that a policy should not be considered a finished project once a formal political 
decision has been made, but rather as being caught in a constant process of development, making it 
increasingly difficult to isolate decision-making from implementation, and output from process 
(Easton 1953; Friedrich 1940; Kingdon 1995; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). We illustrate 
this line of reasoning in figure 1, where we suggest that factors associated with input legitimacy 
determine the level of pre-implementation public policy support, factors associated with through-
put legitimacy determine the level of support during the implementation phase, and output legiti-
macy factors affect the level of post-implementation support. 
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FIGURE 1, TYPES OF LEGITIMACY AND THEIR POSITION IN RELATION TO THE STAGES OF THE 
POLICY PROCESS 
 
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the synchronous relationship between the phases constituting a policy process, i.e., the formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of policy, and the different forms of legitimacy (input, throughput, and output). As the two ar-
rows suggest, the output of, and public reaction to, one policy decision sets the agenda for future policy formulation thus creating a 
cyclical motion over time. 
 
Modeling the Policy Process 
In this section we sketch a simple theoretical model that illustrates our theoretical reasoning that 
goes through the three steps of the policy process in accordance with figure 1. We think of a time-
line, where t = 1 indicates the input phase, t = 2 the throughput phase, and t = 3 the output phase. 
In t = 1, we focus on input legitimacy, i.e., the procedures concerning both acquisition of power 
and decision-making and the trust in policy makers’ ability to make high-quality decisions. Accord-
ing to Norris (2011), approval of incumbent office holders and agreement with core principles and 
normative values are important in determining legitimacy at this stage. Hence, we can express input 
legitimacy, 𝐿1, as the positive function 
 
𝐿1 = 𝐿(𝐴1),     (1) 
 
where 𝐴1 measures the approval and agreement of the procedures and of the decision-makers in 
the initial phase. 
 
In order to explain policy support in this initial phase, we add to the perceived legitimacy of the 
political process the effect of expected policy outcomes. To account for expected outcomes we 
include both consequences for the individual in terms of perceived changes in costs and benefits 
(e.g., Frey 1997; Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz 1995; Schuitema, Steg, and Forward 2010,) and for the 
collective in terms of the policy’s ability to reach collective goals (e.g., Jagers and Hammar 2009; 
Kallbekken and Sælen 2011; Lubell, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2007). Individual, i’, policy support in the 
input phase thus depends on the expected utility following the policy:  
 
𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐸𝑖[𝑈(𝐶𝑖 , 𝐺, 𝐿𝐼𝑁)],      (2) 
 
where E indicates the expectations operator. Ci is the individual’s private consumption and G is the 
(positive) effect generated by the policy. Expected utility of the policy is also affected by how legit-
imate the process is perceived for the time being. That is, for given levels of Ci and G, the individu-
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al experiences a higher level of well being if the policy is perceived to be legitimate than when poli-
cy making is done illegitimately. Hence, support in the initial input phase, 𝑌1, depends positively on 
the expected outcomes Ci and G, as well as on 𝐿1: 
 
𝑌1 = 𝑦(𝐸(𝐶𝑖 ), 𝐸(𝐺), 𝐿1),                  𝑌1 ∈ (−∞, ∞),   (3) 
 
where Y1 > 0 implies approval of the policy and Y1 < 0 implies objection toward it. 
In the two subsequent phases, the decision has already been made and the decision-makers are 
evaluated by the citizens who compare the decision and policy with their personal attitudes. The 
change in approval, A, from one phase to another can be described as 
 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡−1 = 𝑎(𝑌𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑡),    ∀𝑡 > 1    (4) 
 
𝐷𝑡 = {
𝛼𝑡 > 1        if  𝑌𝑡−1 < 0
1                   otherwise
                                        
  
𝑎 is a positive function, implying that the stronger the policy support in the previous phase, the 
more one will approve of the politicians who made the decision or implemented it (depending on 
the phase) in a similar vein as retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981). The inclusion of D suggests that due 
to disappointment aversion, the marginal effect on approval would be stronger for those who ob-
jected to the decided policy than for those who approved of it (see e.g., Gul 1991). We also let this 
effect vary across phases, as the disappointment may be more decisive in some phases than in oth-
ers. 
 
When it comes to legitimacy in the throughput and output phases, it would still be affected by approv-
al (like in (1)) and the change in legitimacy is expressed as a consequence of altered approval in the 
following way: 
 
𝐿𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡−1 = 𝑙[(𝐴𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐹𝑡],     (5) 
 
 𝐹𝑡 = {
𝛽𝑡 > 1        if  𝐴𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡−1 < 0
1                   otherwise
                                        
 
 
Just as the change in approval between the phases could be affected by disappointment, it is likely 
that a reduction of legitimacy following reduced approval is stronger than the increase following an 
approval increase of the same magnitude. 
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Legitimacy in phase t could thus be expressed as the sum of input legitimacy from (1) and the 
changes in (5). However, to allow for persistence in preferences, we let the effective legitimacy in 
phase t = 2 and t = 3, ?̂?𝑡, be 
 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝐿1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘(𝐿𝑘 − 𝐿𝑘−1)
𝑡
𝑘=2     (6) 
 
𝛾𝑘 ∈ [0, 1]. 
 
Hence, we could express effective legitimacy in the throughput and output phases as 
 
L̂2 = L1 + γ2(L2 − L1) = (1 − γ2)L1 + γ2L2 
L̂3 =  L1 + γ2(L2 − L1) + γ3(L3 − L2) = (1 − γ2)L1 + (γ2 − γ3)L2 + γ3L3. 
 
No persistence against the policy would imply that γ2 = γ3 = 1, i.e., only present legitimacy ex-
plains effective legitimacy in a certain phase. No change of legitimacy over the policy process, or 
even the full policy cycle, would instead imply that γ2 = γ3 = 0. 
 
Policy support in later phases follows the same structure as the one in the input phase, shown in 
(3), where the relevant legitimacy measure is the effective one, L̂t, determined in (6): 
 
Yt = y(Et(Ci ), Et(G), L̂t),                  Yt ∈ (−∞, ∞),     t=1, 2, 3  (7) 
 
Depending on the phase, the measures of Ci and G are either expected values or actual values based 
on the individual’s own experience after implementation. Note that L̂t in phase t > 1 may also de-
pend on legitimacy perceived in previous phases, depending on the values of γ2 and γ3. Hence, poli-
cy support in, e.g., the throughput phase becomes a function of both input and throughput legiti-
macy. 
 
This exposure has shown how legitimacy and policy support may evolve over the policy process 
and the possible links between the different measures in the three phases. Initial approval of policy 
makers may have long-lasting effects since it affects input legitimacy, which together with expected 
policy outcomes determines support in the input phase where policy is being formulated. This sup-
port is, in turn, important for how the policy makers are judged once they make the decision. If the 
decision goes against the general opinion, approval is reduced and legitimacy is likely to fall. This 
change in legitimacy will possibly affect support into the next period (unless γ2 = γ3 = 0) and so 
on. Next, we will apply this model to a specific policy process and test it with unique panel data. 
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Hypotheses 
With guidance from the model above, we can formulate a set of hypotheses that will be tested em-
pirically in section 4. We apply the model to the decision and implementation of a congestion tax in 
Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg. We will analyze both policy support (what people think 
of the tax itself) and legitimacy in a policy process consisting of three phases (as measured by how 
the decision and implementation processes were perceived). Our theoretical model allows us to 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Legitimacy is a driver of policy support in all phases of  the policy process. 
H2: The sources of legitimacy vary across the different phases of the policy process.  
 
Concerning legitimacy, equation (6) opens up different possibilities. H2 tests whether γ2 = γ3 = 0 
(i.e., whether there are changes in the sources of legitimacy) or rather  γt > 0, t = 2, 3 (i.e., whether 
effective legitimacy changes over time). According to (5) we should look for changes in legitimacy 
as a consequence of altered approval as we proceed across the policy process. Moreover, (7) indi-
cates that there is an interconnected relationship between legitimacy and policy support at the in-
put, throughput, and output phases, respectively (i.e., γt ∈ (0, 1), t = 2, 3). Thus, 
 
H3: Public policy support in one phase of the policy cycle is a function of legitimacy in both the present and the previ-
ous phase(s) of the policy cycle. 
 
Once we have established that legitimacy in previous phases also matters, we can finally hypothe-
size the relative strength by γt >
γt−1
2
, t = 2, 3, that is, 
 
H4: If H3 holds, legitimacy in the present phase has stronger explanatory power of present policy support than legiti-
macy in previous phases has. 
 
Method, Measurements, and Descriptive Statistics of Data 
 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field experiment constituted by the introduction of a con-
gestion tax in Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden. A congestion pricing mechanism 
(CPM) is a policy tool aimed at charging the users of certain goods and services for the negative 
externalities generated by the peak demand in excess of available supply. At a price of zero, demand 
exceeds supply, causing a shortage that is corrected by charging the equilibrium price rather than 
bringing demand down by increasing the supply. This pricing mechanism has been used in several 
public utilities and public services for setting higher prices during congested periods as a means to 
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better manage the demand for the service and to avoid expensive new investments just to satisfy 
peak demand, or because it is not economically or financially feasible to provide additional capacity 
to the service. The Gothenburg congestion tax (Swedish: Trängselskatt i Göteborg) is a CPM im-
plemented as a tax levied on most vehicles entering and exiting central Gothenburg, including some 
main roads passing by the city. The congestion tax was introduced on January 1, 2013, primarily to 
reduce traffic and improve the environmental situation in central Gothenburg, as well as to help 
financing a number of large road and rail construction projects in and around Gothenburg (Trans-
portstyrelsen 2016). In figure 2, we illustrate the timing of the data collection in relation to key 
events during the congestion tax policy process. 
 
FIGURE 2, KEY EVENTS AND TIMING OF DATA COLLECTION FOR THE GOTHENBURG CONGES-
TION TAX 
 
The data was collected through a panel survey across seven waves, from May 2012 to October 
2014. Enabling a test of changes in public attitudes as the tax implementation was nearing, the first 
wave of data collection took place seven months before the Gothenburg congestion tax was im-
plemented, followed by a second wave in December 2012, three weeks before the implementation 
of the congestion tax, in January 2013. Approximately five months after the tax implementation, in 
May 2013, a third wave of data collection was conducted in order to measure differences in public 
attitudes before and after the implementation. Data collection encompassing fewer observations 
and questions, along with a significant drop in response rate, continued in November 2013, June 
2014, and September 2014, just before a referendum on the tax. The last wave was carried out in 
October 2014, just after the referendum. Here, we make use of three waves clearly distinct in time 
and corresponding to the input, throughput, and output phases of the policy process: May 2012 
(wave 1), May 2013 (wave 3), and September 2014 (wave 6). 
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Before the first wave of data collection, we recruited 7,888 potential participants from two sources. 
Primarily, participants were recruited through a pop-up ad on the website of the main local daily 
newspaper in the Gothenburg region (Göteborgs-Posten) reaching out to more than 400,000 readers 
(year 2013), which yielded 4,998 participants who registered their e-mail addresses for the panel 
study. In addition, a second supplementary participant recruitment method was used, consisting of 
a large-scale mailed invitation to a random sample from the Swedish population register, and it 
resulted in an additional 2,890 participants who registered their e-mail addresses for the panel study. 
The second additional recruitment round was undertaken in order to ensure more variation in the 
sample. Further, this second sample consisted of two strata in order to include a sufficient number 
of people living inside the planned toll zones, which was expected to be an influential factor on 
public attitudes toward congestion taxes (Eliasson 2009). Residential area had to be a selection cri-
terion because the share of people living inside the planned toll zone in the entire Gothenburg 
region is very small, approximately 8%. 
 
Of the 7,888 people who registered their e-mail address in the panel, 70% (N = 5,521) responded 
to the first panel wave, about 65% (N = 5,127) to the second wave, and 60% (N = 4,732) to the 
third wave. In the last wave we use for our analysis—the sixth wave in September 2014—we have 
1,422 respondents, but some of them were recruited in later phases. This implies that this study has 
a within-subjects design with 980 respondents participating in all three waves that we make use of 
in the regressions. The socioeconomic characteristics for the whole sample, as well as for our sub-
sample, are displayed in table 2. 
 
TABLE 2, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 Subsample 
Female 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 
Education (1 = 9+ years, 7 = graduate studies) 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.0 
Age  (2013) 48 48 49 50 
Subjective income (1=very bad, 5=very good) 4.02 4.03 4.02 4.01 
Gothenburg resident 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.63 
Number of obs. 5,512 4,399 1,399 980 
 
Our sample is not perfectly representative of the population as it consists of more educated, older, 
and male respondents than the general population. In all regressions, we therefore controlled for 
gender, education, age, and subjective income. Furthermore, in the sample a majority of the re-
spondents were residing in Gothenburg, whereas most of the remaining respondents resided in 
nearby municipalities. 
 
Our policy support variable was captured by a single item repeated across the waves, where re-
spondents were asked, “What is your general opinion about the congestion tax in Gothenburg?” 
The response alternatives ranged from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). Hence, 4 indicated 
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neutrality (neither positive nor negative). Table 3a shows how this dependent variable changes over 
time, across three waves of data-collection, in the input phase (May 2012), throughput phase (May 
2013), and output phase (September 2014). The first three columns display the figures for the total 
samples in the three waves, while the last three columns contain the subsample data—those who 
participated in all three phases and who we consider as proxies for the input, throughput, and out-
put phases, respectively. Consistent with previous studies on policy support, support for the con-
gestion tax increased with experience, as the respondents became less negative post-
implementation. However, 21 months after the implementation, a majority of respondents still 
displayed negative attitudes. This was also evident when asked for the dichotomous choice, whether 
one is generally for or against the tax, as displayed in the second row of table 3a. In table 3b we 
included all steps and the sample was reduced further. From here it becomes apparent that the 
major changes occur after the implementation (January 2013) and just before the referendum (Sep-
tember 2014), when support increases significantly. 
 
TABLE 3A, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONGESTION TAX 
 Total Subsample  
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 
Total mean (7 steps) 2.62 3.06*** 3.39*** 2.74 3.05*** 3.25*** 
Share against 72.9% 64.4%*** 56.5%*** 69.0% 61.3%*** 56.9%*** 
Number of obs. 5,493 4,703 1,422 980 980 980 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to t-tests. 
 
TABLE 3B, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONGESTION TAX IN ALL SEVEN WAVES AMONG THOSE 
REMAINING IN THE PANEL THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 May 2012 Dec. 2012 May 2013 Nov. 2013 June 2014 Sept. 2014 Oct. 2014 
Total mean (7 steps) 2.74 2.70 3.05*** 3.13 3.10 3.25*** 3.26 
Number of obs. 874 874 874 874 874 874 874 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in waves 1 and 2 at the 1% level according to t-tests. 
 
The total distribution of responses indicates that the most reluctant respondents, i.e., those who 
answered that they are very negative to the congestion tax (response alternative 1), account for the 
major change as their share decreased from about 48% in the first wave to 38% in the second and 
to 33% in the third.3 
 
Although the congestion tax was implemented in Gothenburg, it naturally affects everyone driving 
into and out of the city. Apparent from table 4, a majority of our sample resided in Gothenburg, 
though not necessarily within the tolls, and the share is fairly stable across the waves. In all waves, 
those residing in Gothenburg are significantly less negative to the congestion tax than are those 
living outside of Gothenburg. 
 
                                                     
3
 Statistics are available on request. 
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TABLE 4, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONGESTION TAX BY CITY OF RESIDENCE (TOTAL SAMPLE) 
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 
 Gothenburg Outside Gothenburg Outside Gothenburg Outside 
Total mean (7 steps) 2.78 2.34*** 3.14 2.83*** 3.52 3.18*** 
Share against 69.2% 79.1%*** 62.5% 69.7%*** 53.9% 62.1%*** 
Share of obs. 63% 37% 63% 37% 64% 36% 
Note: *** indicates that those residing in and outside of Gothenburg have different attitudes at the 1% level. 
 
To measure our variable of main interest, legitimacy, we focus on three items, where the respond-
ents were asked to indicate how democratic, how open, and how fair they perceived the decision-
making process to be. Response alternatives ranged from 1 (not at all democratic/not at all 
open/highly unfair) to 7 (completely democratic/completely open/highly fair) and are presented in 
table 5. In the last wave, only information about the democracy aspect was available, and as the 
three measures are highly correlated, we use this variable as a proxy for legitimacy in our regression 
analyses in section 4. 
 
TABLE 5, PROCEDURAL FACTORS. MEAN VALUES 
  Total   Subsample  
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 
Democratic?  2.38 2.53*** 2.59 2.49 2.57*** 2.50*** 
Open?  2.41 2.36**     
Fair?  2.54 2.60***     
Number of obs. 4,094 4,094 1,418 980 980 980 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to t-tests. 
 
Overall, respondents consider the process as neither democratic, nor open or fair. Comparing the 
results before and after implementation, the process was regarded significantly more democratic 
and less unfair after implementation. At the same time, it was regarded as significantly less open. 
 
As pointed out in section 2.4, perceptions of the legitimacy of the political process are likely to be 
affected by the approval of and trust in the institutions responsible for it. Here, institutional trust 
was measured using a set of items on both a general level, focusing on trust in national political 
authority, and more specifically on local political institutions. The respondents were asked to indi-
cate their level of trust in the Swedish government, the Swedish parliament, the municipal council, 
the municipal executive board, and the municipal public administration. Response alternatives 
ranged from 1 (very high trust) to 5 (very low trust), with 3 labeled as neither high nor low trust. 
Table 6 displays the extent of institutional trust reported by the total sample of respondents before 
and after implementation of the policy. 
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TABLE 6, INSTITUTIONAL TRUST. MEAN VALUES (1 = MEANS HIGH TRUST, 5 = LOW TRUST) 
 May 2012 May 2013 
Trust in central government 2.64     (2.66) 2.6    (2.67) 
Trust in parliament 2.72     (2.72) 2.71    (2.70) 
Trust in municipal government 3.53     (3.68) 3.66***   (3.81***) 
Trust in municipal council 3.51     (3.64) 3.63***   (3.77***) 
Trust in municipal administration 3.44     (3.56) 3.50**     (3.62***) 
Number of obs. 3,790    (2,393) 3,790    (2,393) 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% level according to t-tests. Results for 
Gothenburg residents in parentheses. 
 
Between 2012 and 2013, trust in national politicians does not change. However, trust in the munic-
ipal politicians is significantly lower after the implementation of the congestion tax. Respondents 
residing in Gothenburg are no different from the total sample in terms of national institutional 
trust, but they have significantly lower trust in the municipal institutions.4 As might be expected, 
the correlation between political trust on the municipal level and the respondents’ view of the pro-
cess is rather high. There are also strong correlations between political trust on the local level and 
support for the congestion tax, while the corresponding correlations are approximately zero for 
trust toward national politicians. 
 
Additionally, to gauge the policy version of output legitimacy we also included a number of items 
tapping into the citizens’ expectations and experiences of the policy and its consequences. When 
the policy has been in place for some time, citizens have not only experienced the personal effects 
of the policy but have also received and consumed information regarding societal impacts. The 
respondents were therefore asked to indicate the extent of agreement with a number of questions 
tapping into both personal and societal consequences. All items were measured on a 7-point scale 
and displayed in table 7. 
 
  
                                                     
4
 It is not meaningful to make a direct comparison with institutional trust in the output phase, since there was a general 
election held in September 2014 implying that there were different politicians in office at the time of data collection. 
However, in order to reduce problems with multicollinearity we instrumented trust by predicted values, which also 
means that we are able to include trust for the third wave in the regression analysis. 
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TABLE 7, PERSONAL AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES. MEAN VALUES (1 = DO NOT AGREE, 7 = FULLY 
AGREE) 
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept 2014 
The congestion tax goes against my values 4.66 4.45***  
I will have it better than before 2.41 2.93*** 2.62*** 
My economic situation will be worse 4.29 4.12*** 3.70*** 
It violates my sense of freedom 4.30 4.08***  
I think it will affect my quality of life negatively 3.98 3.76*** 3.76 
My travel time will be shorter  2.13 2.93*** 2.42*** 
    
It is a necessary measure 2.72 3.03*** 3.11** 
It is a fair measure 2.70 2.84*** 2.84 
It contributes to protect future generations  2.91 3.13*** 3.10 
It Contributes to protect the environment 2.98 3.17*** 3.12 
It affects primarily those causing the problems 3.09 3.17**  
    
It will be very cumbersome to pay 3.22 2.41***  
How will the tax affect the congestion (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) 3.22 3.07*** 3.69*** 
How will the tax affect the pollution (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) 3.32 3.26**  
How will the tax affect the noise (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) 3.58 3.55   
How will the tax affect the city’s economy (1 = diminish, 7 = increase) 4.18 4.28*** 4.35** 
Number of obs.
A 
3,580/976 3,580/976 976 
Note: *** and ** indicate a significant difference from the means in the previous wave at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, 
according to t-tests. 
A For variables covered in the two first waves only, the sample is 3,580. The sample for questions covered in all waves consists of 
976 respondents. 
 
Like for the attitude toward the tax itself, when it comes to the personal outcome expectancies 
people became significantly less negative after the tax was implemented. After implementation, the 
measures were in terms of experiences rather than expectations and it seems that many of the con-
sequences turned out to be less negative than expected (most measures were valued significantly 
more positive in May 2013 than one year earlier). However, the attitudinal development after im-
plementation was not equally uniform. Whereas respondents in September 2014 were more positive 
concerning some aspects (e.g., their own economy and the city’s economy), they clearly became 
more negative about others (e.g., the effect on congestion and their own travel time). 
 
Results 
 
In the following, we use regression analysis to establish the relationships between legitimacy and 
policy support. All regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS )and some of the right-hand-
side variables are instrumented by predicted value in order to reduce problems with multicollineari-
ty.5 
 
Table 8 shows the raw results where the dependent variable is the support for the congestion tax in 
the input, throughput, and output phases. In model 1, we examine support in the input phase, i.e., 
                                                     
5
 Alternatively, one could have used ordered logit or probit, but the qualitative results are the same in OLS and easier to 
display. Ordered logit or probit results are available on request. Collinearity is tested for in all regressions and the pre-
sented specifications are not problematic concerning this issue. 
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well in advance of the policy implementation. As an explanatory variable, we include input legitima-
cy as measured by the predicted values from the regression that is displayed in the first column in 
table 9. We also include the expectations of some of the personal and political outcomes that were 
presented in table 7.6 In the second phase, May 2013, the congestion tax had been in place for al-
most five months. Analyzing the support in model 2, we still control for input legitimacy, but also 
for the potential change in perceived legitimacy between 2012 and 2013. The effect of throughput 
legitimacy could therefore be interpreted as the sum of the coefficients of legitimacy in 2012 and 
the difference. However, people tend to be persistent in their views and the support in 2013 could 
to a large degree be explained by support in 2012. Since input legitimacy may affect initial support, 
the estimate of input legitimacy could be biased. Therefore, we also control for support in 2012 in 
model 2b. In May 2013, we control for the experienced outcomes. Models 3a and 3b follow the 
same structure for support in the output phase. For the sake of comparability, all regressions in 
table 8 are run on the subsample that responded to the questions in all three waves. 
 
TABLE 8, OLS REGRESSIONS FOR SUPPORT FOR THE CONGESTION TAX 
 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
 May 2012 May 2013 May 2013 Sept. 2014 Sept. 2014 
      
Legitimacy (2012)
A 
0.529*** 0.643*** 0.182*** 0.465*** 0.126** 
 (0.0713) (0.0748) (0.0493) (0.0722) (0.0540) 
Change in legitimacy (2013–12)  0.0997*** 0.129*** 0.0493 0.109*** 
  (0.0333) (0.0213) (0.0350) (0.0256) 
Change in legitimacy (2014–13)    -0.0114 0.0713** 
    (0.0421) (0.0308) 
I will be worse off economically  -0.397*** -0.372*** -0.105*** -0.341*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0163) (0.0219) (0.0172) 
Shorter travel time  0.368*** 0.236*** 0.0941*** 0.398*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0189) (0.0311) (0.0244) 
Congestion increases  -0.317*** -0.321*** -0.094*** -0.259*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0275) (0.0421) (0.0310) 
City’s economy improves  0.0548* 0.0801** 0.00455 0.182*** 0.0450** 
 (0.0315) (0.0327) (0.0209) (0.0307) (0.0229) 
Support 2012   0.736***  0.645*** 
   (0.0197)  (0.0223) 
Female 0.227** 0.268** 0.147** 0.194* 0.136* 
 (0.100) (0.106) (0.0680) (0.100) (0.0731) 
Age 2013 -0.0136*** -0.0198*** 0.00753*** -0.0156*** -0.00710*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00376) (0.00242) (0.00360) (0.00264) 
Education -0.0503 -0.0781* -0.0470* -0.0747* -0.0429 
 (0.0385) (0.0405) (0.0259) (0.0388) (0.0283) 
Gothenburg 0.350*** 0.442*** 0.0879 0.388*** 0.104 
 (0.0958) (0.100) (0.0647) (0.0959) (0.0706) 
Income -0.129** -0.0434 -0.0164 -0.0600 -0.0245 
 (0.0537) (0.0559) (0.0357) (0.0532) (0.0388) 
Constant 3.563*** 3.912*** 1.489*** 3.312*** 1.243** 
 (0.421) (0.445) (0.291) (0.435) (0.298) 
      
Number of observations 972 969 969 966 966 
R squared 0.593 0.568 0.824 0.603 0.789 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
A Instrumented by predicted values. 
 
From table 8 it is clear that input legitimacy is a highly important explanatory factor for support in 
the input phase. In the throughput phase, input legitimacy still plays a role, although throughput 
legitimacy is more important. In the output phase, just before the referendum, legitimacy in all 
                                                     
6
 Due to collinearity, we cannot include all measures. 
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phases matters to a significant degree, where output legitimacy plays the most important role. The 
expectations/realizations of policy outcomes matter in all phases. 
 
Many of the variables included in the regressions in table 8 are significantly correlated,7 which 
makes the magnitudes of the coefficients somewhat unreliable. However, the qualitative results (i.e., 
signs) are valid. In order to reduce this potential endogeneity problem, we also present the results in 
difference terms in table 9. 
 
In table 9 we instead analyze changes in legitimacy and policy support throughout the political pro-
cess and make use of samples as large as possible in each phase.8 In the input phase (model 1), we 
first regress legitimacy as proxied by perceived democracy in the political process on political dis-
trust and political interest in addition to the socioeconomic control variables. The predicted values 
from this regression are then used to instrument legitimacy in the support regression presented in 
model 2, which is similar to the regression presented in model 1 in table 8. 
 
After the input phase, distrust in politicians may change as a consequence of the policy as indicated 
by the theoretical model. Hence, the difference in distrust for local politicians between May 2012  
and May 2013 is regressed on the support for the congestion tax in May 2012. It is, moreover, likely 
that the effect on political distrust is not symmetric if one supports or objects to the congestion tax. 
In order to allow for different responses, we apply a kink design with possibly different slopes de-
pending on support or objection to the congestion tax in 2012. After this regression is run (results 
presented in model 3), the predicted values are used as an explanatory variable for the change in 
legitimacy, which is shown in model 4. Also here we allow for potentially different effects depend-
ing on whether distrust increased or decreased. Change in support between 2012 and 2013 is dis-
played in model 5. Both change in legitimacy as such and reduced legitimacy are included on the 
right-hand side as are the differences between expected outcomes in May 2012 and perceived out-
comes one year later. When we move on to the output phase just before the referendum (models 
6–8), the procedure is the same. 
 
 
 
                                                     
7
 See table A1 in the appendix for a correlation matrix. 
8
 Table A2 in the appendix is a corresponding table for the subsample who participated in all three waves. The results 
are similar although less significant than those in table 8. 
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TABLE 9, REGRESSIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT, OLS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Legitimacy May 2012 Support May 2012 Change in Political 
Distrust May (2013–
12) 
Change in Legitimacy 
May (2013–12) 
Change in Support 
May (2013–12) 
Change in Political 
Distrust Sept. (2014–
May 2013) 
Change in Legitimacy 
(Sept. 2014–May 2013) 
Change in Support 
(Sept. 2014–May 2013) 
         
Political distrust 2012 -0.691***        
Changed distrust 
A 
   -0.646***   -1.634***  
Increased distrust
A 
   -0.233***   0.0247  
Legitimacy 2012
B 
 0.160***       
Change legitimacy      0.144***   0.106*** 
Reduced legitimacy      -0.0554**   -0.0381 
Support last wave   -0.0295***   0.0381   
Objected last wave   0.0395**   0.0072   
Tax has neg. effect on personal 
economy  
 -0.233***       
My travel time will be shorter   0.151***      
 
 
Tax protects environment   0.519***       
Tax increases congestion   -0.114***       
City’s economy will improve   0.0216**       
Change personal economy.      -0.0776***   -0.0403** 
Change environment      0.190***   0.106*** 
Change congestion      -0.0302***   -0.0193 
Change travel time      0.0689***   0.0270* 
Change city’s economy will 
improve  
    0.0200**   0.0224 
Political interest -0.214***   -0.0664*   -0.0242  
Income  -0.0522***   -0.0372***   0.00704 
Gothenburg 0.381*** 0.0666** 0.0609** 0.0185 -0.0462 0.139** 0.154 0.0362 
         
Observations 5,293 5,216 4,078 3,800 3,890 1,204 1,004 1,234 
R squared 0.178 0.718 0.013 0.024 0.171 0.013 0.023 0.049 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results are controlled for gender, age, and education. 
A The change in political distrust between the present and the previous period is instrumented by predicted values.  
B Input legitimacy is instrumented by predicted values. 
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From model 1 in table 9, it is clear that distrust of local politicians reduces input legitimacy, while a strong 
political interest increases it. In model 3, we see that the support for the congestion tax affects the change 
in distrust and that the effect is much stronger for those who object to the congestion tax than for those 
who support it.9 Exactly the same pattern is found in model 4, where legitimacy changes as a consequence 
of altered trust; changes in distrust have a significant effect on legitimacy, but the effect is stronger for 
increased distrust. Hence, throughput legitimacy is different from input legitimacy and can be explained by 
reduced trust for the local politicians, which in turn is explained by the objection to the policy, just as 
suggested in the theoretical model. Change in support between the input and throughput phases depends 
significantly on the change in legitimacy, especially if legitimacy was reduced between 2012 and 2013. Also 
changes in the expected policy outcomes are significant with expected signs. 
 
Models 6–8 in table 9 show the results of the output phase. Our analysis of the output phase is conducted 
like the throughput phase: we analyze whether the attitude toward the policy alters political trust. We find 
that the updated attitude toward the congestion tax has no effect on political distrust in this phase, but it 
seems like the political cost came together with policy implementation and there is no further change in 
political distrust that can be attributed to the policy attitude. The change in legitimacy, shown in model 7 
can still be explained by altered distrust, but there is no longer any different impact  from whether distrust 
has increased or decreased. Concerning policy support, the change between the throughput and the out-
put phases depends on the change in legitimacy, but once again, there is no difference depending on the 
direction of legitimacy change. We can thus conclude that the strongest effect from policy support on 
legitimacy occurs between the input and throughput phases. Legitimacy in all phases also seems to matter 
for policy support, where the strongest effect comes from present phase legitimacy. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our main theoretical argument suggests that the policy process is dynamic, implying that the drivers of 
public policy support, and therefore support itself, are changing over the time, during which policy is be-
ing decided on and implemented. However, we also argue that perceived legitimacy in the input phase 
may indeed have lingering effects that have an impact on support in the throughput and output phases. In 
order to test these hypotheses on the case of the Gothenburg congestion tax policy process, we conducted 
                                                     
9
 The congestion tax was initiated and first decided on by the local council but then also formally decided on by the central 
parliament. Interestingly, the corresponding regressions for the central government and the parliament show completely insignif-
icant results. Thus, although both central and local politicians were involved in the decision, only the latter experienced a politi-
cal cost in terms of reduced trust. 
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a set of operations enabling us to analyze how the antecedents of public support for the congestion tax 
varies across the input, throughput, and output phases, respectively. Doing so, we found that input legiti-
macy, i.e., institutional trust and positive perceptions of the decision-making processes and procedures, 
indeed is an important explanatory factor for policy support in the input phase. In addition, there are also 
lingering effects of input legitimacy on policy support in the subsequent throughput and output phases, 
although this effect is reduced as factors more readily connected to the more immediate phase become 
increasingly important. In addition, we found that perceptions of policy outcomes affect support in all 
three phases being studied, but they have slightly different effects as these perceptions change from mere 
expectations to actual experiences. 
 
Furthermore, change in support between the input and throughput phases depends significantly on 
change in legitimacy perceptions, and in our particular case this is especially so if legitimacy was reduced 
between 2012 and 2013. As predicted by theory, we also found that distrust of local politicians weakens 
perceptions of input legitimacy, while a strong political interest increases it. The initial level of support for 
the congestion tax affects subsequent changes in political trust with the effect being significantly stronger 
for those objecting to the congestion tax than for those supporting it. This pattern was also found when 
legitimacy changed as a consequence of altered trust; changes in political trust have a significant effect on 
legitimacy, but the effect is stronger for increased distrust. Hence, and as illustrated in figure 1, throughput 
legitimacy is different from input legitimacy and this can be explained by reduced trust in local politics, 
which in turn is explained by experiencing the implementation of a policy one initially objected to. 
 
Taken together, these results imply support for all our hypotheses becuse with the data we have used, we 
find that (1) legitimacy is a significant driver of policy support in all phases of  the policy process, (2) the 
sources of legitimacy vary across these phases, (3) public policy support in one phase of the policy cycle is 
a function of legitimacy in both the present and the previous phases of the policy cycle, and (4) the rela-
tionship between pre- and post-implementation legitimacy appear to be hierarchical as the importance of 
legitimacy in the present phase is more important than legitimacy in previous phases. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A range of political science research on policy feedback loops have demonstrated how public opinion 
changes as a result of policy implementation, following Schattschneider’s (1935) proposition that new 
policy is indeed conducive to new politics. However, to date the literature has mainly focused on the atti-
tudinal effects of policy outputs or outcomes (e.g., Pierson 1993; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Soss 1999; 
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Soss and Schram 2007), whereas the question of if, and the processes by which, policy attitudes change 
during the process of deciding on and implementing a policy, has been less explored. Apart from the the-
oretical relevance of better understanding these processes to grasp the dynamics of the public opinion-
public policy nexus, knowledge about the mechanisms of public opinion in this respect also pertains, em-
pirically, to the overall effectiveness of and political possibilities to introduce various policy measures and 
to make political priorities. 
 
In this article we have used unique panel data to explore the process of changing policy attitudes in a poli-
cy-cycle perspective, tracing public policy support and its antecedents across two and a half years from 
initial political decision-making to the post-implementation period covering the input, throughput, and 
output phases of the policy process. Specifically, we demonstrate how public support for the introduction 
of a large-scale congestion tax in the Swedish city of Gothenburg is affected by changes in perceptions of 
legitimacy, pertaining both to the processes and procedures of decision-making and to the expectations 
and experience of substantial outcomes resulting from the congestion tax. Our analysis shows that alt-
hough first impressions last, because legitimacy in the input phase retains significance for policy support 
in later phases, the sources of legitimacy and therefore of policy support also change during the policy 
process as new experiences, rather than expectations, of individuals and the collective come to the fore. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the policy process indeed is dynamic and we show clear interactions 
between policy support and legitimacy that help us understand how policy attitudes develop. When aiming 
to better understand how and why public opinion changes as a result of policy implementation, attitudes 
in the output phase cannot be taken at face value. Rather, this dynamic relationship between political 
events and public policy support points to the significance of exploring the mechanisms behind policy 
attitudes in each phase of the policy cycle, as the perceptions of legitimacy that drive public policy support 
are not the same throughout the process from decision-making to implementation and policy evaluation. 
Attitudes of the policy and expectations of its effects in one phase may very well affect the perceived legit-
imacy in future phases, which in turn affects future attitudes and so on. 
 
We have made a first attempt to thoroughly scrutinize the dynamics of the policy cycle by analyzing how 
perceptions of legitimacy, both toward the inputs to the policy process and its proposed outcomes, 
change over time to affect policy support in different phases. Through the use of panel data and a within-
subjects design with 980 respondents, we have been able to follow the development of policy attitudes 
throughout the policy process and trace these developments to the changes in political trust, perceptions 
of decision-making procedures, as well as increasing experiences of policy outcomes. Although this ap-
proach reveals a great deal of the antecedents of public policy attitudes, and will be a way forward for 
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future empirical research into the policy-opinion dynamic, further studies might focus on the political side 
of the story by more closely analyzing the specifics of the decision-making and implementation processes 
and how the debate surrounding new policy is played out in media and among political elites, potentially 
affecting both initial public attitudes and the retrospective formation of policy support. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1, CORRELATION MATRIX FOR VARIABLES IN MAY 2012 
 Support Instrumented 
Legitimacy 
Tax Has Neg. 
Effect on Personal 
Economy 
Travel Time Will 
be Shorter 
Tax Increases 
Congestion 
City’s Economy 
Will Improve 
Support 1      
Instrumented 
legitimacy 
0.42 1     
Tax has neg. 
effect on personal 
economy 
-0.61 -0.30 1    
Travel time will be 
shorter 
-0.48 -0.28 0.34 1   
Tax increases 
congestion 
0.47 0.22 -0.28 -0.29 1  
City’s economy 
will improve 
0.16 0.12 -0.09 -0.12 0.08 1 
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TABLE A2, REGRESSIONS ON ATTITUDES FOR THE SUBSAMPLE WHO TOOK PART IN ALL THREE PHASES OF THE SURVEY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Legitimacy (May 
2012) 
Support (May 2012) Change Political 
Distrust (May 2012–
2013) 
Change Legitimacy 
(May 2012–2013) 
Change Support May 
(2012–2013) 
Change Political 
Distrust (May 2013-
Sept. 2014) 
Change Legitimacy 
(May 2013 - Sept. 
2014) 
Change Support–
(May 2013 - Sept. 
2014) 
         
Political distrust 2012äää’ -0.814***        
Changed distrust
A 
   -0.670   -1.321***  
Increased distrust
A 
   -0.331***   -0.00164  
Legitimacy 2012
B 
 0.164***       
Change legitimacy      0.133***   0.0957*** 
Reduced legitimacy      -0.0300   -0.0667 
Support last wave   0.0190   0.0358***   
Objected last wave   -0.300**   -0.068   
Tax has neg. effect on per-
sonal economy 2012 
 -0.229***       
My travel time will be shorter 
2012 
 0.592***       
Tax protects environment 
2012 
 -0.0561*       
Tax increases congestion 
2012 
 0.155***       
City’s economy will improve 
2012 
 0.00497       
Change personal ec.onomy      -0.0561***   -0.0630*** 
Change environment      0.170***   0.0768*** 
Change congestion      -0.00365   -0.00166 
Change shorter travel time      0.0489***   0.0246 
Change city’s economy will 
improve  
    -0.000787   0.0177 
Political interest -0.137   -0.145**   -0.00939  
Income  0.0407   -0.0121   -0.00176 
Gothenburg 0.574*** 0.147** 0.0707 -0.0964 -0.0383 0.156** 0.126 0.0103 
         
Observations 975 971 976 975 960 976 921 962 
R squared 0.230 0.756 0.018 0.041 0.120 0.016 0.016 0.039 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results are controlled for gender, age, and education. 
A The change in political distrust between the present and the previous periods is instrumented by predicted values. 
B Input legitimacy is instrumented by predicted values. 
 
 
